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Mulry: Drug Crimes and Firearms

IMMEDIATE ACCESSIBILITY OR MERE
TRANSPORT: TiE DUELING
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE "CARRYING"
ELEMENT OF 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c)(1)
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, Congress has sought to impose enhanced
penalties for those individuals convicted of narcotics trafficking
who choose to further their crime by the use or carrying of a
firearm.I The enactment of such legislation seems to have
followed a national outcry for help from the federal government
in dealing with the drug problem in the United States.2 In a
country where drug-related, drive-by shootings and gang violence
are an everyday occurrence, the federal government has been
called upon to create a tougher and more consistent criminal code
to help wage its war on drugs. Equipped with such legislation as
§ 924 (c)(1), courts are mandated to impose minimum sentences
for those drug related offenses that are exacerbated by the
presence of a firearm.4
'See 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c)(1) (Supp. 1998).
2 See William W. Wilkins, Jr. et al., Competing Sentencing Policies in a
"War on Drugs" Era, 28 WAKE FORESTL. REV. 305, 315 (1993).
3 Vivian Artenstein Alberts, Federal Sentencing Enhancement: Mandatory
Penaltiesfor Firearms Use Under the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984, 19 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 823, 826 (1986). See also Smith v. United
States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993). Justice O'Connor points out that in 1989 "56
percent of all murders in New York City were drug related" and the
percentage in Washington, D.C. was "as high as 80 percent." Id. at 240.
4 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c)(1) provides:
Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or
drug trafficking crime (including a crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime which provides for an enhanced punishment
if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or
device) for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the
United States, uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to
the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five
years, and if the firearm is a short-barreled rifle, shortbarreled shotgun, or semiautomatic assault weapon, to
imprisonment for ten years, and if the firearm is a
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Since the amendments which have attached severe penalties to
narcotics crimes where firearms play a particular role, courts
have struggled with the construction and plain-meaning of the

statute, so as not to impose strict mandatory sentences for crimes
not fully intended by Congress.
Specifically at issue has been the meaning of the terms "uses"
or "carries" with respect to the defendant and the firearm in
question. The United States Supreme Court in Bailey v. United
States' provided guidance for courts in dealing with the issue of
what constitutes "use" of a firearm under § 924 (c)(1). In
Bailey, the defendant was charged with drug trafficking when a
search of his car's passenger compartment during a routine traffic
stop revealed twenty-seven bags of cocaine and a round of

ammunition.7 After his arrest for possession of cocaine, police
searched the locked trunk of his car and found large amounts of
cash and a bag containing a loaded pistol.8 The presence of the
firearm formed the basis of Bailey's conviction under § 924 (c)(1)
machinegun, or a destructive device, or is equipped with a
firearm silencer or firearm muffler, to imprisonment for
thirty years. In the case of his second or subsequent
conviction under this subsection, such person shall be
sentenced to imprisonment for twenty years, and if the
firearm is a machinegun, or a destructive device, or is
equipped with a firearm silencer of firearm muffler, to life
imprisonment without release. Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, the court shall not place on probation or
suspend the sentence of any person convicted of a violation
of this subsection, nor shall the term of imprisonment
imposed under this subsection run concurrently with any
other term of imprisonment including that imposed for the
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime in which the
firearm was used or carried.
Id.
5 See, e.g., United States v. Foster, 133 F.3d 704 (9th Cir. 1998). The
amendments are not intended to reach people such as policemen who are
authorized to carry a firearm then commit a crime without the aid of the
firearm. Id. at 707 n. 8.
6 516 U.S. 137 (1995).
7
Id. at 139.
8 Id.
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resulting in a consecutive sixty-month prison term added onto the
underlying drug sentence.9
The Bailey Court necessarily narrowed the definition of "use,"
placing the burden on the government to show "active
employment" of the firearm. Accordingly, mere possession is
not enough to constitute "use" under § 924 (c)(1).10 Under
Bailey, the active-employment understanding of "use" certainly
includes brandishing, displaying, bartering, striking with, and
most obviously, firing or attempting to fire, a firearm."
Despite Justice O'Connor's specificity for the "uses"
terminology of § 924 (c)(1) in Bailey, some question remains as
to the scope of the "carry" prong of the statute. The question is
further complicated by the frequently occurring situation where
drugs and firearms are found aboard a moving vehicle, and are
used in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. In such
circumstances, the "carrying" requirement of § 924 (c)(1) would
seemingly be satisfied in that a gun aboard a moving vehicle is
actually "transported" or "conveyed" along with the drugs,
forming the basis of the predicate offense.
It is the objective of this Comment to discuss this issue,
specifically the degree of accessibility of a firearm aboard a
moving vehicle necessary to sustain a "carrying" conviction
under § 924 (c)(1). It will also address the differing views of the
various circuits, which have created a true conflict in
interpretation. This circuit split has resulted in a recent grant of
certiorari by the United States Supreme Court which will decide
the scope of the "carry" prong of the statute this term. 2 This
Comment will then specifically analyze the two cases which have
been consolidated for argument before the Supreme Court.
Finally, upon summarizing the divergence of the circuits, this
Comment will conclude by predicting how the Supreme Court
9Id.
10

Id. at 143.

1Id. at 148.
See Cleveland v. United States, 106 F.3d 1056 (1st Cir. 1997), cert.
granted, 66 U.S.L.W. 3416 (U.S. Dec. 16, 1997) (No. 96-8837); Muscarello
v. United States, 106 F.3d 636 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 66 U.S.L.W.
3416 (U.S. Dec. 16, 1997) (No. 96-1654).
12
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might eventually rule with regard to the permissible scope of 18
U.S.C. § 924 (c)(1).
II. BACKGROUND

18 U.S.C. § 924 (c)(1) imposes a mandatory five year term of
imprisonment for using or carrying a firearm during and in
relation to any drug trafficking offense.' 3 "When Congress
enacted the current version of § 924 (c)(1), it was no doubt aware
that drugs and guns are a dangerous combination."' 4 Indeed, it
has become increasingly self-evident that guns and drugs go
hand-in-hand. 15 This close relationship between drug crimes and

firearms perhaps led to the inception of modem-day § 924 (c)(1),
"the policy response of the legislative and executive branches
to... heightened public concern about the escalating drug and
violence problems
"1....
,6
Congress first made strides toward mandatory sentencing for
7
drug-related crimes with the Narcotic Control Act of 1956'

which imposed lengthy mandatory minimum sentences for "drug

1'See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
14 Smith

v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 240 (1993).

1' See U.S. v. Giraldo, 80 F.3d 667, 676 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that "guns
are among the common 'tools' of the narcotics trade.").
16 Wilkins, supra note 2, at 306.
,7 Pub. L. No. 84-728, 70 Stat. 567 (1956). The Narcotic Control Act of
1956 amended the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and the Narcotic Drugs
Import and Export Act "to provide for a more effective control of narcotic
drugs.. .. " Id. The Act states in pertinent part:
Whoever fraudulently or knowingly imports or brings any
narcotic drug into the United States or any territory under its
control or jurisdiction... or in any manner facilitates the
transportation, concealment, or sale of any such narcotic
drug... shall be imprisoned not less than five or more than
twenty years ....
Id. at 570. Furthermore, the Act states that "the imposition or
execution of sentence shall not be suspended [and] probation shall not
be granted." Id. at 569.
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importation and distribution offenses."

8

However, the Act was

met with much resistance because of its severity, and it was

eventually repealed in 1970.19 In the next decade, the nation
became dissatisfied with the "revolving-door system" 20 of justice,
where "offenders often were incarcerated, deemed rehabilitated,
and released only to start the cycle anew." 2' Congress' response
was two-fold: (1) the reform of sentencing guidelines," and (2)

the imposition of mandatory sentencing?
Section 924 (c) was originally enacted in 1968 as part of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,24
proscribing the unlawful carrying of a firearm while engaged in a
federal felony? The 1968 statute however proved ineffective as
a deterrent, allowing both parole and suspended sentences.?

Furthermore, the Supreme Court at that time interpreted § 924 (c)

"as a cumulative enhancement provision, rather than as a
separate, additional offense." 27 Thus, if the underlying offense
itself called for statutorily imposed enhanced sentences, § 924 (c)
could not be used to impose further enhancements.?

Michael J. Riordan, Using a Firearm during and in Relation to a Drug
Trafficking Crime: Defining the Elements of the Mandatory Sentencing
Provisionof 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(1), 30 DuQ. L. REv. 39, 39 (1991).
19 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971).
18

2'1Wilkins,
Id.

supra note 2, at 305.

2Id. at 306.
2 Id.

See Allan L. Schwartz, Construction and Application of Provision of
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C. § 924(c))
That Person Who Uses Firearm to Commit, or Carries Firearm Unlawfully
During Commission of, Federal Felony, Shall Be Sentenced to Term of
Imprisonment in Addition to Punishment for Such Felony, 25 ALR FED 678,
679-80 (1975).
25Id. at 680.
26 Thomas A. Clare, Smith v. United States and the Modem Interpretationof
18 U.S.C. §924(c): A Proposalto Amend the FederalArmed Offender Statute.
69 NOTREDAME L. REV. 815, 823 (1994).
2 Id.
I See generally Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6 (1978).
24

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1998

5

Touro Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 2 [1998], Art. 14

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 14

In 1984, both parties in Congress responded to a public concern
over the "nation's rising crime rate" 29 with the enactment of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 [hereinafter
"CCCA"',]) an extensive crime bill which sought to revise many
areas of the federal criminal code including "bail reform,
narcotics enforcement, forfeiture, and sentencing." 3 Indeed, the
Reagan Administration staunchly supported the passage of the
CCCA claiming interest in "improv[ing] the efficiency and
coordination of Federal law enforcement, with special emphasis
on violent and drug-related crime."32

Congress amended § 924 (c) and incorporated it into the
CCCA,33 requiring mandatory five year sentences without parole,
thereby curtailing judicial discretion in sentencing. 4 Proponents
of mandatory sentencing see many advantages to these reforms,
citing more predictable prison terms, increased public safety,
increased efficiency of federal law enforcement, and increased
deterrence to violent and drug-related crime.35 On the other
hand, critics of mandatory minimum penalties such as those
prescribed by § 924 (c)(1), claim a disadvantage in the
impairment of a judge's ability to consider each defendant on a
case-by-case basis.36 There is also a serious concern as to
increased prison overcrowding.37 "[W]here mandatory sentences
for serious crime had gone into effect, both time served and
incarceration rates increased." 38
Alberts, supra note 3, at 832.
1 Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat.
1837 (1984).
31 Riordan, supra note 18, at 42.
32 Alberts, supra note 3, at 833 n. 80.
33 The 1984 Amendment changed the "any felony" language to "any crime
of violence" and inserted the words "and in relation to" following the word
"during." As such, there must be some nexus between the violent predicate
offense and the use or carrying of a firearm. Also, the term 'unlawfully' as
pertaining to the carrying of a firearm was eliminated.
I35 Alberts, supranote 3, at 832.
Id. at 833.
36 Id. at 832.
37
Id. at 831.
29

38 Id.
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As further ammunition in its continuing war on drugs, Congress
again amended § 924 (c)(1) in 1986, applying mandatory
minimum sentencing to drug crimes as part of The Firearm
Owners' Protection Act.39 As such, a person who "during and in
relation to ... [a] drug trafficking crime ... uses or carries a

firearm" is subject to the five-year mandatory minimum sentence
enhancement of 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c)(1).A
The various amendments to § 924 (c) have been criticized as
"piecemeal legislation," 41 thus resulting in inconsistency in
interpretation. 42 On the whole, however, the "purpose of [these]
amendments... was to impose harsher sanctions 'where
firearms facilitated, or had the potential of facilitating, the
commission of a felony,' and, more specifically, the commission
43
of a drug trafficking crime."
III. THE CIRCUITS IN CONFLICT
"Section 924 (c)(1) has been the source of much perplexity in
the courts. The circuits are in conflict both in the standards they
have articulated and in the results they have reached."" Since
Bailey v. United States,45 the circuit courts have been better able
to distinguish the "use" of a firearm "during and in relation to a
drug trafficking offense" as set forth by the statute. As
articulated in Bailey, "use" connotes "active employment" of a
firearm rather than mere possession.46 Furthermore, "use"

39 Pub.

L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 921 (1986)).
40 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c)(1) (Supp. 1991). The 1986 amendment inserted the
"drug trafficking crime" language after "any crime of violence," thus
imposing enhanced penalties if some nexus between the use or carrying of a
firearm and some drug trafficldng offense occurs. Id.
41 Clare, supra note 26, at 825.
42 d. at 825-26.
4 Riordan, supra note 18, at 46 n. 55.
"Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 142 (1995).
45516 U.S. 137 (1995).
46M. at 143.
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should mean "to avail oneself of,"4" which would include, but not
be limited to, brandishing, displaying or firing, of a firearm.48
The Bailey Court recognized that the interpretation of "use" and
"carry" could overlap under § 924 (c)(1). 4 9 However, the Court
was loathe to find that Congress "intended that they be
understood as redundant."" ° Rather, the decision in Bailey
reserved an independent meaning for the "carry" prong of the
statute, stating that "a firearm can be used without being carried,
e.g., when an offender has a gun on display during a transaction;
... and a firearm can be carried without being used, e.g., when
an offender keeps a gun hidden in his clothing throughout a drug
transaction.""
The question of the use or carrying of a firearm in the
commission of a narcotics trafficking crime is further complicated
by the locale of many drug arrests, a moving vehicle. As case
law illustrates, many drug offenders are apprehended while in
transit, usually in the role of courier of both drugs and weapons. 2
Without brandishing, displaying, or mentioning the firearm in the
vehicle, it could hardly be said that the defendant "used" the
firearm under the Bailey criteria. Rather, most often, guns in this
scenario are hidden in the glove compartment, 3 under the seat,-4
47

Id. at 150.

48 Id.
49

at 148.
Id.at 145.
'0 Id. at 146.
s'Id.

52 See United States v. Pineda-Ortuno, 952 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1992)
(affirming gun carrying convictions where defendants admitted operating a
vehicle knowing that guns and drugs were hidden under the back seat). The
Fifth Circuit noted that "the word 'carry' derives from the french carier,
which means 'to transport in a vehicle'. . . ." Id. at 104; see also United
States v. Freisinger, 937 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that transporting a
firearm in the passenger compartment of a vehicle containing drugs suffices for
a section 924 (c) conviction); see also United States v. Ramos, 861 F.2d 228
(9th Cir. 1988) (finding the fact that a defendant transported cocaine and a
concealed weapon en route to a drug sale sufficient to prove a causal
connection between firearm and drug trafficking crime).
" See United States v. Farris, 77 F.3d 391, 393-94 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating
that a gun found in the glove compartment of a vehicle which was being used
as a drug distribution center, was "carried" for purposes of section 924(c)).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol14/iss2/14

8

Mulry: Drug Crimes and Firearms

1998

DRUG CRIMES AND FIREARMS

507

or even within secret compartments inside the vehicle." In these
situations, courts differ as to whether such placement of a
firearm, while arguably close in proximity to both the defendant
and the drugs, still suffices for a carrying charge under § 924
(c)(1).56
In United States v. Pimentel,17 the Second Circuit dealt with the
situation of a defendant, Pimentel, who was found in the front
passenger seat of a car during a drug transaction wherein a loaded
gun, drugs, and cash were to be found in a secret compartment
on the back of his seat. Access to the secret compartment was
accomplished by Pimentel's co-conspirators in the crime.Y The
driver, Berroa, who by "pressing the rear defogger button on the
car's dashboard plus a button by the door on the driver's side of
the car" 6° opened the compartment to an accomplice, Morrell,
who was positioned in the back seat ready to exchange drugs and
money from within the compartment.6
Pimentel was
subsequently convicted of narcotics trafficking, as well as using
and carrying a firearm during and in relation to the underlying
drug crime."
He appealed the firearm count contending

See United States v. Eaton, 890 F.2d 511, 512 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding
that a gun found under the front seat of the truck defendant was driving could
be deemed "carried" under section 924 (c), given that the gun was loaded, that
it was within easy reach, and that statements made by defendant showed intent
to use the gun to protect the contraband).
11 See United States v. Pimentel, 83 F.3d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that
a gun hidden from view in a secret compartment within a car from which
drugs are distributed suffices for a carrying conviction).
5-See United States v. Travis, 993 F.2d 1316 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 510
U.S. 383 (1993) (affirming carrying conviction under section 924 (c)(1) where
firearms were found in locked glove compartment of car that defendant was
driving). But see United States v. Cruz-Rojas, 101 F.3d 283, 286 (2d Cir.
1996) (arguing that despite the transport of concealed drugs and weaponry, the
gun conviction should be vacated because the gun was hidden "up under the
dash of [the] vehicle," and thus was not readily accessible to defendants).
57 83 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 1996).
5 8d.
at 57.
59
60 Id.

Id.

61

Id.

6Id. at 57-58.
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insufficient evidence to show that he used or carried the gun." 3
Furthermore, he claimed that the gun was indeed inaccessible to
him.64
The court agreed, as per Bailey, that the gun was not actively
employed and thus not "used." 65 However, Pimentel was still
liable for the "carrying" prong of § 924 (c)(1) under a
Pinkerton66 theory of liability which states that a co-conspirator
may be held responsible for the substantive acts of a coconspirator if those acts are performed in furtherance of the
conspiracy, and may reasonably be foreseen as a consequence of
the conspiracy. 6 Here, Pimentel was found to be part of the drug
conspiracy.6 "Morell and Berroa had collaborative access to the
gun,"" and there was ample evidence to show that Pimentel knew
of the presence of the gun and could reasonably foresee the
carrying of the firearm as part of the conspiracy.70
The Pimentel court relied on United States v. Giraldo7' in
determining that Morrell and Berroa committed the substantive
offense for which Pimentel was ultimately held liable.2 Morrell
and Berroa each had a part in gaining access to the gun, thus it
was immediately accessible to them in collaboration."
In
Giraldo, a change dish between the two front seats of a Pontiac

63Id.
at
64

58.

id.

id.
6 See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-48 (1946); see also
United States v. Pazos, 993 F.2d 136, 141 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that " [a]
conspirator in a drug conspiracy can be held liable for a coconspirator's § 924
(c) violation because it is reasonably foreseeable that a firearm may be carried
during a drug transaction.").
65

67

Alois Valerian Gross, J.D., Federal Criminal Liability of Narcotics

Conspiratorfor Different Substantive Crime of Other Conspirator, 77 ALR
FED 661, 662 (1986).
6'Pimentel, 83 F.3d 55 at 58.
69

Id.

70

Id.

7' 80

F.3d 667 (2d Cir. 1996).
72 Pimentel, 83 F.3d at 58.
7

id.
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easily lifted out to expose a hiding compartment for a firearm.7"
The Second Circuit concluded that the driver, Fermin, carried the
firearm in relation to a narcotics offense when: (1) the gun was
easily within his reach, (2) he knew the gun was there, and (3) it
could be inferred that the car belonged to him, as he was the
driver, and he did have documents of ownership of the car on his
person. 75 Furthermore, a carrying charge may reasonably be
sustained in the case of a concealed weapon when, "in some
circumstances, a defendant puts a gun into place to protect drugs
or to embolden himself." 76 In sum, "Second Circuit law requires
'at least a showing that the gun was within reach during the
commission of the drug offense in order to sustain a conviction
for carrying a firearm.'"77
In defining the "carry" prong of § 924 (c)(1), many courts have
looked to the ordinary meaning of the term itself for guidance.
The First Circuit adopted a definition of "carry" that
In United States
incorporates the "element of transportation."
v. Ramirez-Ferrer,7 the court utilized Webster's Third New
International Dictionary to find varied definitions of "carry" as
follows:

"to move while supporting (as... in one's hands or

arms)," "to move an appreciable distance without dragging," and
"to bring along to another place."m
The facts of Ramirez-Ferrerinvolved an illegal drug distribution
operation and a loaded gun aboard a moving boat.' The gun was
found partially hidden but in close proximity to the defendant at
the time the boat was interdicted.2 The court conceded that
Ramirez-Ferrer did not "move the firearm while supporting it in

74
Giraldo, 80 F.3d at 672.
75
76

Id.

d. at 675 (quoting United States v. Bailey, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995)).
*r United States v. Santos, 84 F.3d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting United
States v. Feliz-Cordes, 859 F.2d 250, 253 (2d Cir. 1988)).
78 United States v. Ramirez-Ferrer, 82 F.3d 1149, 1152 (1st Cir. 1996).
7' 82 F.3d 1149 (1st Cir. 1996).
go Id. at 1152 (citing WEBSTER'S THiRD NEW DICTIONARY 343 (1986)).
81 Id. at 1150.
2Id.
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[his] hands or arms .... "83 "However, transporting a firearm
on a boat would certainly implicate moving it 'an appreciable
distance without dragging it"' 4 or "bringing it along to another
place. ' 81 The court upheld the conviction for carrying under
§ 924 (c)(1) based on the accessibility of the gun and the physical
transportation of the weapon in relation to the drug offense.8"
Similarly, "a number of courts of appeals have held that
possessing a firearm in an automobile during and in relation to a
drug trafficking crime constitutes 'carrying' under § 924
(c)(1)." In United States v. Eyer,88 the Third Circuit ruled that
the presence of a fully loaded gun found with drugs in the console
between the two front seats of a car satisfied the carrying prong
of § 924 (c)(1) simply in that the gun was easily accessible and in
transit aboard the vehicle.89
In United States v. Brockington,9o the Fourth Circuit recognized
that one is guilty of carrying a firearm under § 924 (c)(1) when
its presence is used in relation to the drug trafficking crime.91 In
this case, Brockington was arrested as he was riding in a taxi, and
found to have drugs in his possession clearly intended for
distribution."' Furthermore, a fully loaded weapon was found
"under the floormat directly beneath Brockington's seat in the
cab." 93 The Brockington court affirmed the conviction for
"carrying" a firearm despite the fact that the defendant was not
physically carrying the firearm at the time." The court based its
83

Id. at 1153.

84 id.

85 id.
8
6Id.

at 1154.

' See United States v. Eyer, 113 F.3d 470, 475 (3rd Cir. 1997).
88 113 F.3d 470 (3rd Cir. 1997).
89

Id. at 476.

90 849 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1988).
91 Id. at 876.
92ld. at 874.
93Id.
I Id. at 876. "Th[e] evidence, coupled with the common sense recognition
that drug dealing is a dangerous and often violent enterprise, more than
supports an inference that Brockington carried the weapon to facilitate his
'business.'" Id.
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decision on the defendant's admission that he possessed the
firearm for protection, and that he carried the weapon to facilitate
his business. 95
The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Pineda-Orturo
differentiates between "carrying" on one's person and via some
medium of transport.Y7 "When a vehicle is used, 'carrying' takes
on a different meaning from carrying on the person because the
means of carrying is the vehicle itself."" In Pineda-Orturo,large
quantities of drugs and firearms were found inside a detained
vehicle occupied by the defendants.99 The evidence amply
showed that the defendants operated the vehicle with knowledge
of the presence of the firearms, and the firearms were in the car
during and in relation to a drug-related crime. 00 The Fifth
Circuit then noted that while constructive possession ordinarily
might not equate to carrying, "constructive possession will
support a conviction for carrying a firearm in a motor vehicle, if
the operator of the vehicle knowingly possesses the firearm in the
vehicle during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime." 101
Thus, unlike the Second Circuit, the Fifth Circuit does not
require that the gun carried aboard a moving vehicle be
immediately accessible and within reach.
The Sixth Circuit, however, requires a higher degree of
accessibility with regard to a weapon aboard a moving vehicle.
In United States v. Riascos-Suarez,'1 the court found "that in
11 Id. See also United States v. Mitchell, 103 F.3d 649 (4th Cir. 1997).
"[B]ecause the firearm placed in the trunk of the automobile for the journey to
the [drug] transfer point is obviously being 'carried' under the plain meaning
of that term, the firearm does not cease to be 'carried' simply because it is not
readily accessible to the offender." Id. at 653-54.
96952 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1992).
97

Id. at 103-04.

1 Id. at 104.
99Id. at

100.

100 Id. "Here, [defendants'] control over the vehicle, which they both
admitted driving, when combined with [defendants'] nervousness, conflicting
statements, and implausible stories, is sufficient to support a finding that they
had knowing possession." Id. at 102.
101 Id. at 104.
10273 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. 1996).
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order for a defendant to be convicted of carrying a gun in
violation of § 924 (c)(1), the firearm must be immediately
available for use -- on the defendant or within his or her reach.

Such availability takes the weapon beyond simple possession or
storage." 011 In this case, a police detective stopped the defendant
for speeding, and upon asking the defendant to exit the vehicle,
he visibly noticed a handgun placed in the driver's side of the
console.'10 Although no drugs were actually found in the vehicle,
evidence within the car successfully led investigators to
defendant's hotel room where large amounts of cocaine were
being readied for distribution. 10 The presence of the handgun in
this case, immediately accessible to defendant and in transit
aboard defendant's vehicle, could easily be regarded as protection
for defendant's nefarious dealings. As the court noted, the
weapon's "presence or involvement was not the result of
coincidence." 06
As further confirmation, the Sixth Circuit in United States v.
Malcuit,0 7 vacated a carrying conviction where defendant had
large amounts of drugs and money in his car at the time of his
arrest, but the firearm which was the basis of his conviction, was
found in a duffel bag on the back seat of his car.09 Here, Malcuit
argued that the presence of the weapon "was coincidental and
entirely unrelated to the drug offenses." 109 The court struck down
the government's argument that constructive possession of the
weapon aboard a moving vehicle in the context of a drug-related
crime satisfies the "carry" prong of § 924 (c)(1)." 0 "The mere
availability of a firearm near a drug stash is not sufficient when
the government fails to show a nexus between the firearm and the
drug trafficking crime."'"
103

Id. at 623.

101
Id. at 620.
105id.
10

Id. at 623.

107

104 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 1996).

'08

Id. at 881-82.

09

at 883.

1

Id.

110

Id. at 886.
Id. at 885.

"I
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In United States v. Moore, 2 the Sixth Circuit expanded upon its
decision in Riascos-Suarez, adding that a definition of "carry"
under § 924 (c)(1) should also take into account an element of
"transportation."" 3 While "immediate availability" was a key
factor of the decision in Riascos-Suarez, the Sixth Circuit in
Moore qualified it as a "necessary, but not sufficient,
determinant.""14 "A definition of 'carry' that takes only
availability into account ignores the term's most obvious
connotation, i.e., physical transportation.""' Therefore, under
Moore, the Sixth Circuit requires the government to prove that
the weapon was immediately accessible and that the defendant
was in the process of physically transporting the firearm in
conjunction with a drug trafficking crime." 6
Seventh Circuit jurisprudence in this area focuses on the nexus
between firearm and drugs, "and not [on] the distance between
owner and gun at the moment of arrest."" 7 In United States v.
Molina,' a carrying conviction was affirmed where a stash of
cocaine and a loaded semiautomatic pistol were found in a secret
compartment in defendant's car." 9 The question of whether a gun
needs to be immediately accessible was deemed to be irrelevant.1'3
Indeed, the court specifically noted that "a gun does not have to
be within a defendant's immediate reach" for a conviction under
§ 924 (c)(1).12 1 In Molina, the fact that the defendant placed the
gun in the secret compartment with the drugs, and then
11276 F.3d 111 (6th Cir. 1996).
3

1
114

Id. at 113.
Id.

IsId.

1161Id.

"17 United States v. Molina, 102 F.3d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1996). "The
question before us is not where the gun was located at the time of the arrest,
but rather did the defendant carry the gun during and in relation to a drug
trafficking crime." Id. at 931.
"8 102 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 1996).
9
" Id. at 929. The secret compartment was found in defendant's 1989 Chevy
Blazer "underneath the face of the speaker located in the rear seat on the
driver's side wall of the vehicle." Id.
12

Id. at 932.

121Id.
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transported these items as he drove in the car, was enough to
satisfy the requirements of the statute.'2
In United States v. Freisinger,'1 the Eighth Circuit looked to the
ordinary meaning of the word "carries" for interpretation of
§ 924 (c)(1). The court noted that common usage of the term
would certainly include carrying of a firearm within a moving
vehicle. 24 In Freisinger,defendant was stopped and arrested for
drunken driving.'2 Upon inspection of the car, law enforcement
found large amounts of drugs, cash, drug paraphernalia, and
multiple firearms. '2 Among the weaponry found in the car were
a gun case with rifle and ammunition, and three loaded revolvers
placed in a knotted pillowcase, within a large plastic bag, in the
back seat. 27 The court believed this to be ample evidence to
support a 'carrying' of the weapons' 28 in connection with the drug
operation. "The evidence conclusively established that there
were four firearms in the passenger compartment of Freisinger's
car. That alone constitutes 'carrying' as that term is used in
common parlance."1 29
A more recent Eighth Circuit case reaffirms Freisingeras good
law, reiterating the rule for carrying under § 924 (c)(1) as
follows: "to transport a firearm within the passenger
compartment of a vehicle loaded with drugs is to 'carry' a
firearm."'" In United States v. Nelson,'3' two unloaded shotguns

and a loaded revolver were found in defendant's car along with a
large quantity of marijuana.'
Testimony adduced at trial and
11 Id. "If a firearm and drugs are in the same place, and the gun has been
moved at all, such as with a car, then both the carrying and relation prongs
have been established even if both the gun and the drugs are locked together in
the.. .car." Id.
12 937 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1991).
124 d. at 387.
125d. at 385.
' Id.
127 Id.

Id. at 387.
12 id.
'2

'3o
13'

32

United States v. Nelson, 109 F.3d 1323, 1326 (8th Cir. 1997).

109 F.3d 1323 (9th Cir. 1997).

Id. at 1325.
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admissions by the defendant himself revealed that Nelson had
possession of both the drugs and the guns within the car and that
the loaded revolver, although concealed under the back seat
carpet, was within reach from the driver's seat.D Accordingly,
the court affirmed an accessibility requirement, stating that
"ready availability of the firearm is required for a 'carry'
conviction in this Circuit." 114
Decisions in the Ninth Circuit over the past twenty years show a
swing in statutory interpretation. In United States v. Barber,'"
the Ninth Circuit first adopted a broad definition of "carry." '
The court formulated a "transportation test" to decide the specific
issue of whether a gun is carried in a vehicle during a drug
In Barber, the defendant argued that the common
crime.1
understanding of the word "carries" is that of "bearing the
weapon upon one's person or having the gun within his
immediate control."' In response, the court espoused its view
that Congress never intended such a narrow reading of the word
'carries,' and that the ordinary meaning that connotes
'transportation' may be used for interpretation."
In Barber, defendant was arrested in his girlfriend's Jaguar an
hour after he fled the scene of a controlled drug buy."' A search
of the vehicle turned up a firearm in the locked glove
133

Id.

1

1326; accord United States v. Peyton, 108 F.3d 876 (8th Cir. 1997)
(affirming a carrying conviction where a loaded pistol was found under the
front seat of the car defendant was driving, and where further search revealed
large amounts of drugs and cash in the passenger compartment as well);
United States v. Rhondenizer, 106 F.3d 222 (8th Cir. 1997). "We have
repeatedly held that to transport a firearm in the passenger compartment of a
vehicle loaded with drugs is to carry a firearm within the meaning of 18
U.S.C. § 924 (c)(1)." Id. at 226-27.
135 594 F.2d 1242 (9th Cir. 1979).
136See id.
13 See United States v. Foster, 133 F.3d 704, 710 (9th Cir. 1998) (Trott, J.,
dissenting).
138 Barber, 594 F.2d at 1244.
3Id. at

139Id.
140

Id. at 1243.
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compartment. 4' Despite the fact that Barber never carried the
weapon "on his person," and that it was in a locked compartment
in the car, the court utilized the ordinary meaning of "carry" to
2
connote transportation of the weapon within the moving vehicle.
Furthermore, the court found ample evidence to impute to Barber
a knowledge of the gun in the glove compartment. 43 Although he
was not the owner of the car, he was operating it for purposes of
narcotics trafficking; his use of the car would imply use of the
glove compartment, and his papers found in the glove
compartment along with the gun indicated his access thereof. '"
However, in United States v. Hernandez,'45 the Ninth Circuit
decided a case which involved a drug trafficker and a firearm, but
not a motor vehicle. Hernandez applied an "immediately
available for use" test, which has since been used in the vehicular
context. 46 While not addressing the Barber decision directly, the
Hernandez case and its test for carrying has seemingly supplanted
Barber's "transportation test" in the circuit. 47 In Hernandez,
defendant was arrested in his auto body shop where a locked tool
box was found to contain drugs and a loaded firearm.'
He was
eventually convicted of using or carrying a firearm during and in
relation to a drug trafficking crime and appealed. 4 9 The court
looked to the ordinary meaning of carrying, but found that it
required some activity beyond simple possession.I" Based on this
finding, the court "conclude[d] that in order for a defendant to be
convicted of 'carrying' a gun in violation of section 924 (c)(1),
the defendant must have transported the firearm on or about his

141
'

42

143

Id.

Id. at 1244 (emphasis added).

Id.

4 Id.

'4580 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 1996).
" See United States v. Foster, 133 F.3d 704, 710 (9th Cir. 1998) (Trott, J.,
dissenting).
47
1

141

Id.

Hernandez, 80 F.3d at 1257.

149Id.
110

Id. at 1258.
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or her person." 5' In other words, the gun must be "immediately
available for use by the defendant." There has been some question as to the appropriateness of
Hernandez in non-vehicular cases.'- But, in the very recent case
of United States v. Foster,'l the Ninth Circuit has put any doubt
to rest by reaffirming the holding of Hernandez in a case which
did indeed involve a motor vehicle.' In Foster, defendant was
suspected of manufacturing and distributing methamphetamine.'"
When police pulled Foster over in his pickup truck, they found
"a zipped up bag under a snap-down tarp" in his truck bed.'1
Inside the bag was a loaded, semiautomatic weapon and drug
paraphemalia.Im Based on this evidence, Foster was convicted of
drug trafficking and of carrying a firearm pursuant to § 924
(c)(1).' 59 Since his conviction, the Supreme Court decided Bailey
which once again raised the issue of whether Foster carried the
firearm. The Ninth Circuit "took the case en bane to resolve a
conflict in [Ninth Circuit] caselaw over the interpretation of
carrying a firearm when a gun is found in a vehicle." 11
In an opinion which focuses on "dueling interpretations" of
many terms in the English language, Judge Kozinski pointed out
that the word "carry" could mean "to transport or even to
arrange for something to be transported."'6 On the other hand, it
could mean "to hold an object while moving from one place to
' He chose the narrower definition of "carry"
another."2'

to

151Id.
152 Id.
1 See United States v. Foster, 133 F.3d 704 (9th Cir. 1998). "Hernandez
gives us a perfectly good test for carrying when vehicles are not involved, but
the test fails to give Congressional will its meaning when vehicles are
involved." Id. at 710 (Trott, J., dissenting).
15 133 F.3d 704 (9th Cir. 1998).
155 Id. at 708.
156Id.at 705.
157Id.

158 Id.
159 Id.

160
Id.
161

Id.

16

Id.
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answer the question of whether Foster carried a firearm when he
drove with it zipped up in his truck bed. Judge Kozinski also
consulted Black's Law Dictionary for further support of the
narrower reading. It separately defines "carrying arms" as "[t]o
wear, bear, or carry them upon the person or in the clothing or in
a pocket, for the purpose of use, or for the purpose of being
armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in case of a
conflict with another person."' 63 Anticipating criticism of such a
narrow definition, Judge Kozinski elaborated that "[t]he key
aspect of the narrow definition is not that the weapon actually be
borne on the person. Rather, it is that the weapon remain within
easy reach while the individual is in motion." "I
A dissenting opinion by Judge Trott in Foster illustrates the
need and anticipation for a determination by the Supreme Court
to ultimately decide this issue. 65 In a dissent joined by two other
judges, Judge Trott criticized the majority's result as one that
"gives drug traffickers the least exposure to the law's reach when
they are the most vulnerable to detection by law enforcement." '6
The dissent would return to the "transportation test" of Barber,
extending the definition of "carry" to include the transportation
of a weapon by motor vehicle, regardless if the item carried is
within easy reach. '6
The Tenth Circuit in United States v. Cardenas,16s
distinguished
"carrying" of firearms under § 924 (c)(1) from mere
transportation of frearms. 161 After an exhaustive investigation of
legislative intent, including an analysis of the 1968 meaning of
163 Id. at 706 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 214 (6th ed. 1990)).
164Id.
65 Id. at 714 (Trott, J., dissenting). "While we have been debating this case
en bane, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Cleveland and
Muscarello. I am certain that our opinions will contribute to a final resolution
of166
this issue." Id. (Trott, J., dissenting).
d. at 710. (Trott, J., dissenting).
'67 Id. at 710 (Trott, J., dissenting).
"This holding [in United States v.
Barber] embracing the 'transportation test' made as much sense then as it does
now." Id. (Trott, J., dissenting).
'6'864 F.2d 1528 (10th Cir. 1989).
69
Id. at 1536.
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"carrying," the court held that "mere transportation of a firearm
is not within the purview of section 924 (c)(1)."11 Rather, the
statutory construction of "carrying" requires some degree of
possession as well as transporting, and a weapon aboard a
moving vehicle should be "within effortless reach" to fall within
the statute.17 The Cardenascourt specifically held:
[T]hat when a motor vehicle is used, "carrying a
weapon" takes on a less restrictive meaning than
carrying on the person. The means of carrying is the
vehicle, itself, rather than the defendants hands or
pocket, and the requirement of possession, the exercise
of dominion and control, consonant with the common
legal definition of "carrying" a weapon in a vehicle at
the time of the enactment of § 924 (c) is precisely what
distinguishes "carrying" from mere "transportation."' In this case, a .25 caliber handgun was concealed behind a
potato chip bag in an open compartment on the driver's side
dashboard of Cardenas' car. 17 The gun was "within inches" of
the steering wheel and thus in very close proximity to the driver,
Cardenas.17 4 Furthermore, the defendant admitted knowing that
the gun was in the truck. 75 Such knowing placement and
concealment is indicative that Cardenas held dominion and
control over the weapon and thus "carried" it in relation to his
76
drug offense. 1
United States v. Ross' 7 further supplemented the rather narrow
reading of Cardenas by easing the proximity requirement."" In
Ross, the defendant sold drugs out of the trunk of his car and
0
17
Id.at
171

1534.
Id. at 1533.

7MId. at 1535-36.

173I. at 1530.
174Id. at 1533.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177

920 F.2d 1530 (10th Cir. 1990).

17s1Id. at

1536.
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upon his arrest, police found drug paraphernalia and a loaded
firearm enclosed in his car trunk.179 The Tenth Circuit held "the
jury could have reasonably found that Ross carried the gun with
him in his car during and in relation to his drug distribution
activities."' 80 Thus, lack of proof that a firearm is within
effortless reach will not defeat a "carrying" conviction under §
8
924 (c)(1).' 1
The Eleventh Circuit took the vehicular carrying issue one step
further by attaching § 924 (c)(1) carrying penalties in situations
where a vehicle could be classified as a "drug distribution
center," m and firearms were known to be present therein.'

In

4 evidence showed that (1) a gun found in
United States v. Farris,'1
the glove compartment belonged to defendant; (2) the car in
which the gun was found was used as a base for drug distribution;
and (3) defendant was the drug "salesman" himself.' As such,
the car, the drugs, and the firearm together form a drug nexus
and the defendant could be charged with "carrying" a firearm
86
pursuant to the statute.
The D.C. Circuit, somewhat like the Second Circuit, held that a
firearm must be accessible so as to afford the defendant security
to further his crimes.8 7 In United States v. Evans,'" the
defendants traveled via automobile from New York City to

179Id.

180

Id. at 1536-37.

Id. (emphasis added). While the gun was in the trunk of the car and
arguably inaccessible, the fact that the car itself was the means for defendant's
drug distribution activities, and that the gun was transported in ready fashion
along with evidence of narcotics trafficking, suffices for a carrying conviction
in this Circuit. Id. See also United States v. Miller, 84 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir.
1996). "[Ihe government is required to prove only that the defendant
transported a firearm in a vehicle and that he had actual or constructive
possession of the firearm while doing so." Id. at 1259.
18 United States v. Farris, 77 F.3d 391, 395 (11th Cir. 1996).
18

183

id.

1877 F.3d 391 (1lth Cir. 1996).
185 Id. at 395.
86

1 Id.

8 See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 888 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1989).

88

1

888 F.2d 891 (1989).
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Washington, D.C. with the intent to sell narcotics.1 To carry
out this intent they transported with them a large quantity of
1
"crack" cocaine and guns in a black knapsack. '0
The court
found that it was reasonable for the jury to find that the defendant
carried a firearm "in the sense that it was within reach and
available to protect him during his ongoing crime of possession
with intent to distribute cocaine."' 9
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S POSITION
The United States Supreme Court has had the opportunity to
interpret 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c)(1) in the often-cited case of Bailey
v. United States.192 The Bailey Court altered our understanding of
the "use" prong of the enhancing statute, thus influencing
subsequent case law. Under Bailey, in order to support a
conviction for "use" of a firearm during and in relation to a drug
trafficking offense, the government must show active employment
of the firearm, rather than mere possession.19 In other words,
"use" implies "to avail oneself of," and the inert storage of a
gun for active use later on is insufficient.'1
The Court's narrowing interpretation of the "use" prong of §
924 (c)(1) has expanded the utility of the "carry" prong as an
alternative basis for statutory liability. 19 Pre-Bailey, many courts
equated "use" with "possession" which, in essence, shut out any
role for the term "carries" under the statute.'
After Bailey
limited the definition of use, "the 'carry' prong of section
924(c)(1) ...

brings some offenders who would not satisfy the

'use prong' within reach of the statute." 19,

189 Id.
190 Id.

at 895.

at 894-95.
516 U.S. 137 (1995).
193 Id. at 143, 148.
194Id. at 149-50.
195 d. at 146.
1 Id. "This reading is of such breadth that no role remains for carry." Id.
197Id. at 150.
191Id.
192
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Although Bailey opened the door for convictions based solely on
a "carrying" charge, 19 the Court fell short of defining what
constitutes "carrying" under § 924 (c)(1), as it did for the "use"
prong.' 99 In the absence of United States Supreme Court
guidance, the circuits have been grappling with this question,
searching for clues from legislative history and original meanings
at the time of enactment.nw
Under Bailey, conviction pursuant to § 924 (c)(1) is prohibited
for mere storage and possession of weapons near drugs and drug
proceeds. 2 1 Therefore, one can infer that to "carry" a firearm
within the meaning of the statute, one "must do more than
possess or store a weapon."m Something "more" would imply
immediate availability and proximity to the firearm.203 When a
drug offender puts a gun into position where it will be at the
ready, and will secure the drug transaction, this conscious action
°
supplies something "more" than mere possession and storage. ' M
In evaluating our present question of what suffices for
"carrying" aboard a moving vehicle, it may be inferred that a
weapon found in a car that is the underlying means of transport
for narcotics trafficking is not there by coincidence.
The
everyday connotation of "conveyance" is a complementary
element, which would satisfy a "carrying" charge. Thus, it
seems likely that the Supreme Court would look to the ordinary
meaning of the word "carry" to interpret a case in which a
firearm is present during and in relation to a drug crime. Justice
Scalia, in his dissenting opinion in Smith v. United States, 23

attempted to draw a reasonable dichotomy between 'uses' and
"I See United States v. Moore, 76 F.3d 111 (6th Cir. 1996); See also United
States v. Farris, 77 F.3d 391 (11th Cir. 1996).
' Bailey, 516 U.S. at 148. "The active employment understanding of 'use'
certainly includes brandishing, displaying, bartering, striking with, and, most
obviously, firing or attempting to fire a firearm." Id.
I See United States v. Cardenas, 864 F.2d 1528 (10th Cir. 1989).
201 Bailey, 516 U.S. at 149.
2 United States v. Riascos-Suarez, 73 F.3d 616, 623 (6th Cir. 1996).
203 Id. at 623.
1 See United States v. Giraldo, 80 F.3d 667, 675 (2d Cir. 1996).
205 509 U.S. 223 (1993).
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'carries' as follows: one uses a firearm (as a weapon) and one
carries a firearm ("carrying it in such a manner as to be ready for
use as a weapon").
V. THE SUPREME COURT'S GRANT OF CERTIORARI
This issue of statutory interpretation has split the circuits and
will be addressed by the Supreme Court in a pair of cases
consolidated for oral argument this month.20 Certiorari was
granted in Cleveland v. United States,m a First Circuit case out of

Massachusetts, as well as in Muscarello v. United States,1 9 a
Fifth Circuit case out of Louisiana.
In the First Circuit decision of United States v. Cleveland,1 0 the
court followed the broad "transportation" reading of "carrying"
as exemplified in Ramirez-Ferrer 1 In Cleveland, defendants
Cleveland and Gray prepared to meet with drug suppliers by
putting three loaded handguns inside a duffel bag and then placing
the bag in the trunk of their car.212 It was admitted that the initial
intent in taking along these weapons was to "use the guns to rob
their suppliers of their cocaine."21 1 Meanwhile, the drug supplier
was being surveilled by DEA agents acting on information from
confidential sources. '4 As defendants met with the supplier, the
DEA agents moved in, searched the vehicles and made their
arrests.2 1 5 The presence of the handguns in the trunk of the car
and the admission by defendant of the purpose for which the guns

I Id. at 245-46 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2w See 66 U.S.L.W. 1454 (1998).
20 106 F.3d 1056 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 66 U.S.L.W. 1454 (U.S.
Dec. 16, 1997) (No. 96-8837).
m 106 F.3d 636 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 66 U.S.L.W. 1454 (U.S.
Dec. 16, 1997) (No. 96-1654).
210

106 F.3d 1056 (1st Cir. 1997).

United States v. Ramirez-Ferrer, 82 F.3d 1149 (1st Cir. 1996).
212 C/eve/and, 106 F.3d at 1059.
211

2 13

Id.

214d.
215/d.
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were present, became the basis for upholding defendant's guilty
pleas under § 924 (c)(1)." 6
The First Circuit reduced the "carry" issue in this case to two
questions: "First, must a firearm be on a suspect's person to be
'carried' or can one also 'carry' a firearm in a vehicle? Second,
if one can 'carry' a firearm in a vehicle, must the weapon be
immediately accessible to the defendant to be 'carried'?"" The
answer to the first question had already been established in this
circuit in Ramirez-Ferrer, where the court found that a firearm
could be "carried" in a boat.2"' The First Circuit then looked at
the issue of immediate accessibility in light of case law both preand post-Bailey.219 It concluded, much like the Fourth, Seventh
and Tenth Circuits that the word "carry" under the statute
indicates "transport of a firearm by car," rather than immediate
accessibility to the defendant while being transported.2 0 In
Cleveland, the fact of the guns being moved from one place to
another, and not their accessibility, was determinative in
affirming the convictions."2

In the second of the companion cases granted certiorari by the
Supreme Court, defendant Muscarello pleaded guilty to
distributing marijuana and using and carrying a firearm in
relation to this crime." His guilty plea was based on the fact that
a fully loaded firearm was found in his car's locked glove
While awaiting
compartment at the time of his arrest.22
sentencing, Bailey was decided and Muscarello sought dismissal
of the gun charge claiming lack of evidence to support a showing
of active employment of the gun.2 4 Furthermore, Muscarello
claimed that while he knowingly possessed the weapon in the
21

6 Id.at

217

1068-69.

Id. at 1065.

Id. The court deemed conveyance in a boat to be "indistinguishable for
present
purposes from a land vehicle like a car." Id.
21
9 Id.at 1065-66.
218

22

Id. at 1066.

Id. at 1068-69.
1
United States v. Muscarello, 106 F.3d 636, 637 (5th Cir. 1997).
223
Id.at 638.
221

224

Id. at 637.
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vehicle, he did so by virtue of his job as a bailiff and not in
relation to the drug offense.m
The Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of knowing possession of a
firearm in a vehicle during a drug crime where the gun is locked
in the glove compartment and thus not readily accessible." The
court pointed out that the decision in Bailey did not define the
carrying prong of § 924 (c) and thus does not alter prior
precedent with regard to carrying in a moving vehicle.,
"Consequently, the carrying requirement of § 924 (c)(1) is met if
the operator of the vehicle knowingly possesses the firearm in the
vehicle during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime." n
Here, it is the defendant's knowing possession that triggers the
"carrying" element, despite the fact that the glove compartment
was locked, and despite defendant's claim that the firearm was
present because of his job.29'
The Fifth Circuit reinstated
conviction based on this broad interpretation but cautioned that
not every case of knowing possession will suffice for "carrying"
under §924 (c)(1).2
VI. SUMMARY
18 U.S.C. § 924 (c)(1) imposes mandatory sentencing for those
who use or carry a firearm during and in relation to narcotics
trafficking. 1 After the Supreme Court narrowed the "use"
prong of the statute, the circuits responded by defining the
"carry" prong more broadly? 2 When the facts of a case point to
"carrying" of a firearm aboard a moving vehicle, the plain

n Id.
6

Id.

27Id.

2 id.

at 638.

Igid. at 639.
Id. "Albeit a rarity, it is at least conceivable for such a vehicle-contained
gun to be carried 'during' but not necessarily 'in relation to' the offense." Id.
2 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
12 See generally United States v. Nelson, 109 F.3d 1323 (8th Cir. 1997).
'-
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meaning of the term attaches and prosecution under the "carry"
prong of the statute seems only logical."'
The First Circuit regards evidence that a gun is knowingly
transported in relation to a drug crime as sufficient to support a
carrying conviction.2
The Second Circuit stresses immediate
accessibility to be convicted under the 'carry' prong of the
statute.25 Evidence that a drug offender transported a firearm in
a moving vehicle while that firearm was within reach and
immediately available suffices for a carrying conviction in the
Sixth Circuit. 6 Immediate availability seems to be an important
element in the Ninth Circuit as well. 7 On the other hand, the
Seventh Circuit focuses on a proximity requirement, as between
drugs and firearms, not owner and firearm?238 The Tenth Circuit
emphasizes the means of carrying as the vehicle itself.?29
Similarly, for the Eleventh Circuit, "carrying" a firearm means
carrying aboard a moving vehicle, especially one that is key to a
drug distribution operation. 20 Like the majority of the circuits,
the United States Supreme Court will most probably support the
broader interpretation of the "carrying" prong of § 924 (c)(1).
Since the intent of the statute is to reduce narcotics trafficking as
furthered by the presence of firearms,2 ' the Court will most likely

adopt a more expansive reading of "carry" to bring more
offenders within the reach of its deterrence.
Laurette Domingo Mulry*
2 United States v. Ramirez-Ferrer, 82 F.3d 1149, 1152 (1st Cir. 1996).

Id.

M

United States v. Giraldo, 80 F.3d 667, 677 (2d Cir. 1996).
United States v. Riascos-Suarez, 73 F.3d 616, 623 (6th Cir. 1996).
2 See generally United States v. Foster, 133 F.3d 704 (9th Cir. 1998).
238 See United States v. Molina, 102 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 1996).
United States v. Cardenas, 864 F.2d 1528, 1535-36 (10th Cir. 1989).
240 United States v. Farris, 77 F.3d 391, 395 (11th Cir. 1996).
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236

241

Clare, supra note 26, at 815-16.
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Comment and always; and to Dr. and Mrs. Domingo for a lifetime of love and
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